

*Jeffrey A. Merkley*

115TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

**S. RES.** \_\_\_\_\_

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to make an invaluable contribution to United States and international security, 50 years after it opened for signature on July 1, 1968.

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**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES**

Mr. MERKLEY (for himself, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Ms. WARREN, Mr. DURBIN, and Ms. SMITH) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

*MR. MARKEY  
+  
MR. BROWN*

\_\_\_\_\_  
**RESOLUTION**

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to make an invaluable contribution to United States and international security, 50 years after it opened for signature on July 1, 1968.

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for signature 50 years ago on July 1, 1968;

Whereas the United States and former Soviet Union averted a catastrophic nuclear exchange during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which led to a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements to lessen the chance of nuclear war, including the NPT;

Whereas President John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that as many as 25 countries would acquire nuclear weapons by 1970 absent a treaty to control nuclear weapons;

Whereas the United States Senate provided its advice and consent to the NPT on March 13, 1969, with a vote on ratification of 83 to 15;

Whereas the NPT has grown to include 191 State Parties, making an irreplaceable contribution to United States national and international security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons;

Whereas Article III of the NPT obligates each non-nuclear weapon state to the NPT to conclude a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify treaty compliance, 174 of which are Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements crafted to detect the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to non-peaceful uses;

Whereas the 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review affirms, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It plays a positive role in building consensus for non-proliferation and enhances international efforts to impose costs on those that would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty.”;

Whereas the success of the NPT has and will continue to depend upon the full implementation by all States Parties of the Treaty’s three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament;

Whereas over the past half century, the United States has exhibited leadership in strengthening each of the NPT's three pillars for the global good, including—

(1) reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile of more than 85 percent from its Cold War heights of 31,225 in parallel with equally massive reductions of Russia's stockpile through bilateral coordination;

(2) cooperating with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus—to facilitate the surrender of nuclear weapons on their soil after the fall of the Soviet Union—leading to each country's accession to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states;

(3) providing voluntary contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative exceeded more than \$320,000,000 since 2010 to help in the treatment of cancer and in other life-saving applications; and

(4) extending deterrence to United States allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, and the Republic of Korea—which is an unmistakable demonstration of the United States commitment to collective security;

Whereas heightened geopolitical tensions in recent years have made cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control issues with the Russian Federation more challenging;

Whereas a range of actions by the Government of the Russian Federation has led to a deterioration in bilateral relations with the United States, including Russia's brazen interference in the 2016 United States presidential elections, its violation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (commonly known as the

“INF Treaty”), signed at Washington, D.C., December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988, its illegal annexation of Crimea, its invasion of Eastern Ukraine, and its destabilizing actions in Syria; and

Whereas within a difficult environment, preserving agreements that continue to contribute to United States and global security, particularly the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the “New START Treaty”), is all the more essential, and that to that end, the Department of State confirmed in February 2018 that Russia had met New START’s Central Treaty Limits and stated that “implementation of the New START Treaty enhances the safety and security of the United States”: Now, therefore be it

1       *Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

2               (1) any United States negotiated agreement  
3       with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  
4       (DPRK) on denuclearization must require it to re-  
5       turn to the NPT as a Party in good standing;

6               (2) the United States must maintain support  
7       for the IAEA through its assessed and voluntary  
8       contributions and promote the universal adoption of  
9       the IAEA Additional Protocol;

10              (3) the United States and its allies should pur-  
11       sue diplomatic efforts to ensure that the Islamic Re-  
12       public of Iran remains in compliance with the NPT,

1 as the 2016 and 2017 Reports on Adherence to and  
2 Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation,  
3 and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments  
4 both affirmed;

5 (4) the United States should enter into negotia-  
6 tions on the extension of the New START Treaty  
7 until 2026, which would make any current or future  
8 Russian strategic systems of a range greater than  
9 5,500 kilometers accountable under the Treaty;

10 (5) the United States should work to resolve  
11 Russia's violation of the INF Treaty;

12 (6) all countries who have yet to ratify the  
13 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, done at  
14 New York September 10, 1996, including the United  
15 States, should venture to create the conditions that  
16 allow for entry-into-force of the Treaty, and should  
17 observe a moratorium on nuclear testing until that  
18 time; and

19 (7) the United States Government should con-  
20 tinue to encourage opportunities for cooperation  
21 with other nuclear possessing states to reduce the  
22 salience, number, and role of nuclear weapons in  
23 global military strategies.